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Abstract:    
We study the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good 
production requires specialised inputs. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on both 
the incentive to economize on costs and on strategic considerations.  We explore the 
strategic incentives to outsource and show that asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms 
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number of different international trading setups.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper aims to shed light on the organisational and internationalization strategies of 
firms in oligopolistic industries.   We develop a model in which final good production 
requires the use of a customised intermediate and oligopolistic final good firms decide 
whether to source this input from a non-affiliated outside supplier or to produce it in-house. 
Downstream firms that outsource1 enter a bilateral relationship with an upstream firm that 
must carry out a relationship specific investment in the quality and customisation of the 
input. We apply the model to different trading scenarios to examine how trade liberalisation 
affects the mode of operation and the mode of internationalization decisions of the firms.  
 There has been a rapid expansion in outsourcing in recent years, with firms 
subcontracting activities as diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services – both 
domestically and internationally.   The growing importance of outsourcing, particularly 
across national borders, has resulted in a huge increase in interest in the factors driving the 
‘fragmentation of the vertical production chain’ in both the applied2 and theoretical 
academic literature.   
 As argued by Gibbons (2005, p. 203), “a theory of the firm must define ‘integration’ 
(i.e., whether a given transaction is within one firm or between two) and show why it matters 
(i.e., what trade-offs exist between integration and non-integration, so that the theory 
predicts integration for some transactions and non-integration for others)”. In this paper, we 
contribute to the literature on the theory of the firm by showing how a firm’s make-or-buy 
trade-offs are affected by its strategic interactions with competitors.  
 The early theory of the firm discussed the incentives issues surrounding the emergence 
of the boundaries of the firm within bilateral (e.g. buyer-supplier) settings. Until fairly 
recently, this firm-pair level focus has to a great extent set this literature apart from strands 
of the industrial organisation literature concerned with the emergence of market structures, 
as well as from areas that have developed from advances in microeconomic and industrial 
economic theory, e.g. ‘modern’ international trade and investment theories. The last decade 
                                                 
1  By outsourcing we mean the acquisition of an input or service from an unaffiliated firm whether domestic 
or foreign. This is the standard terminology. Bhagwati et al (2005) use the term in a narrower sense to refer 
to the acquisition of services from unaffiliated foreign firms.  
2   For applied work see, for instance, Abraham and Taylor (1996), Audet (1996), Feenstra (1998), Campa 
and Goldberg  (1997), Hummels et al (2001), and Bartel et al (2005). 
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has seen the emergence of a number of path-breaking contributions that have succeeded in 
contextualising the bilateral buyer-supplier relationships within broader market structures 
that also allow for the incorporation of international interactions.3  One group of papers 
endogenises the mode-of-operation choice in the presence of a specialised input within the 
property-right approach: see Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman 
and Helpman (2004), and Feenstra and Hanson (2005).  Another set of papers is based on the 
transaction cost approach and contextualises the bilateral buyer-supplier relationship within 
a general equilibrium framework that gives rise to ‘market thickness effects’ (McLaren, 
2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2005). In both of these strands of the literature, the 
decision to outsource is endogenous, contracts are incomplete and the intermediate input is 
specialised and requires relationship specific investment.4 Their fundamental contribution is 
to embed the mode of operation decision of the firm within general equilibrium frameworks 
that can account for the role of the standard drivers of international trade specialisation (i.e., 
differences in factor endowments and/or product differentiation and love of variety). 
 Given their emphasis on general equilibrium effects, however, these models (that are 
developed mostly within monopolistically competitive market structures) rule out by 
assumption the existence of strategic interaction between firms.  
 Our paper falls very much within this tradition, in that it aims to contextualise the 
make-or-buy decision of the firm within a broader market structure. In line with the second 
group of papers discussed above, we choose to adopt a transaction cost approach.  Contrary 
to the aforementioned papers, however, we study the organisational and internationalization 
strategies of firms within an oligopolistic setting.   
 The transaction cost approach, as shown by a large body of empirical evidence, 
performs particularly well in explaining the backward integration decision of firms;5 it thus 
                                                 
3  An excellent survey of this literature is offered by Spencer (2005). 
4  The choice between the use of specialised components and generic inputs is endogenised within partial 
equilibrium settings in a number of other papers (see Spencer and Qiu, 2001; Qiu and Spencer, 2002; Head 
et al, 2004; Feenstra and Spencer, 2005).  
5  The Transaction Costs (TC) and the Property-Right (PR) approaches are often considered to be very 
similar in their fundamental predictions; however, it has been argued that they can instead be very different 
(see for instance Whinston, 2003). In particular, the evidence from supplier–manufacturer relationships 
tends to support the predictions of the TC approach, whilst that on manufacturer–retailer or franchisor–
franchisee relationships tends to be much more consistent with the PR approach. In their recent survey of 
empirical evidence on the boundaries of the firm, Lafontaine and Slade (2007), point out that in the context 
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appears to be a natural choice for studying the determinants and implications of the process 
of disintegration (both within and across national borders) of the vertical production chain – 
which concerns mainly the backward integration decision of the firm.   
 The transaction cost perspective, based on the role of incomplete contracts and asset 
specificity, places emphasis on the economising dimension of the make-or-buy decision of 
the firm (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985 and 1991) – which    ultimately rests on a total cost 
comparison of alternative organisational structures. As a result, the majority of the 
theoretical literature based on this approach reflects the conventional view that outsourcing 
is primarily driven by cost considerations.   Cost considerations are of course important 
determinants of outsourcing; however, the existing empirical evidence is by no means 
conclusive as to the contribution of outsourcing to cost savings and/or to improvements in 
the quality of intermediates.6  This evidence suggests that cost-savings may not offer an 
exhaustive explanation of the widespread use of outsourcing. We contend that – to the extent 
that firms have market power – strategic considerations will interact with economising 
considerations in determining the mode-of-operation choice of firms.  Given that empirical 
evidence suggests that the firms that operate internationally (via export, outsourcing and 
foreign direct investment) tend to be larger than firms that operate only domestically (e.g. 
Tomiura, 2007), it is plausible to conjecture that such firms will tend to have market power – 
and that their mode-of-operation decision will therefore be affected by considerations of a 
strategic nature. 
 The existence of a link between strategy and firms’ mode of operation is not entirely 
new.  Within a Cournot setting, Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) show that 
organisational choices are affected by strategic considerations in the firm-customer 
transactions.  Shy and Stenbacka (2003) show that competition in the upstream industry 
affects production efficiency and the choice in the mode of operation of a downstream 
                                                                                                                                                      
of buyer-supplier relationships “there are almost no statistically significant results that contradict TC 
predictions” (p. 658).  
6  There exists survey evidence that outsourcing is greatly motivated by cost reductions (e.g. 
http://www.manpower.co.uk/news/OutsourcingSurvey.pdf), but also that it can lead to lower quality of the 
outsourced inputs (e.g. see the survey by Software Development Magazine, 2004).  Görzig and Stephan 
(2002), using German firm level panel data, find that outsourcing firms experienced a deterioration of 
return per employee. A negative relationship between outsourcing and firm level profitability in the 
electronic industry in Ireland is found for smaller firms by Görg and Hanley (2004). See also Tadelis 
(2007) for further evidence and discussion of how outsourcing ultimately has translated for many 
companies into higher total costs than they had originally anticipated.  
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differentiated Bertrand duopoly when vertical integration involves higher fixed costs but 
lower marginal costs.  Chen et al (2004) present a special case of outsourcing where an 
oligopolistic domestic firm may buy an intermediate from a more efficient firm that is also 
its competitor on the final goods market. This type of outsourcing, which facilitates 
collusion, differs substantially from the one we consider in this paper and highlights a 
different kind of strategic effect. To our knowledge, however, this paper is the first to  
examine the “make-or-buy” decision in a context in which final goods firms compete on the 
product market as oligopolists and in which issues related to relationship specific investment 
and incomplete contracts are also taken into account: in earlier oligopoly papers, the role of 
these key features of the transaction costs approach to the theory of the firm in determining 
the nature of the trade-offs facing firms when making their mode of operation decisions is 
disregarded.7 
In the model we develop, a vertically integrated firm incurs additional governance 
costs that can be avoided by outsourcing.  If the outside supplier is not significantly more 
efficient at providing the intermediate to the required specifications, however, outsourcing 
will raise the final goods producer’s marginal production costs since, as a result of a hold-up 
problem arising from contract incompleteness, the supplier will tend to under-invest in the 
quality of the intermediate. Outsourcing then involves accepting higher marginal costs in 
exchange for a saving on governance costs. A key feature of our model is that we fully 
endogenise the investment decision – and hence the quality of the intermediate good. This, 
in turn, translates into an endogenous marginal cost of production for the final good.  
 We find that both strategic vertical integration and strategic outsourcing are possible 
in equilibrium. Furthermore, unlike most contributions in this literature8, this model gives 
rise to the possibility of ‘mixed outcomes’ in which, even when firms are ex-ante symmetric, 
they may choose different modes of operation in equilibrium; this is consistent with existing 
stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same industry adopt the same mode of operation 
strategy.  We also show that the incentive to outsource is relatively greater for smaller/higher 
                                                 
7   Some contributions on the Japanese Keiretsu are more in line with the standard outsourcing literature. For 
instance, in Spencer and Qui (2001), downstream Cournot oligopolists buy from upstream keiretsu 
members in a context in which investment contracts cannot be written and upstream firms carry out 
relationship specific investments.  Their paper, however, does not endogenise the outsourcing versus 
vertical integration decision.    
8    See for instance Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, and 2005), and Antràs and Helpman (2004). 
 6
cost firms and that outsourcing can be characterised as a defensive business strategy.  In 
contrast, vertical integration can be viewed as an aggressive business strategy.  
 An important reason for the revival of interest in the literature on the boundaries of 
the firm has been the perceived relationship between outsourcing and globalisation. We 
apply our model to examine the effect of trade liberalisation on the mode of operation of 
firms. We show that, although trade liberalisation will tend to increase the 
internationalisation of production, its effect on outsourcing is less clear cut.  
 The model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the mode of operation 
equilibria of the game focussing on the benchmark case of ex-ante firm symmetry. In section 
4, we explore strategic behaviour, show how it relates to inter-firm asymmetries, and discuss 
the idea that outsourcing can often be a defensive business strategy.   In Section 5, we 
examine the effects of trade liberalisation on equilibrium outcomes and on the welfare of 
consumers. Section 6 draws some conclusions from the analysis.  
  
2.  The Model 
Consider two oligopolistic final good firms serving the same market and producing a 
homogenous product.9  To begin with, we shall not need to specify the international trade 
context. Thus, the two firms may compete on a home market, a foreign market, or an 
integrated market such as would exist in a customs union. We will be more specific in 
Section 5, where we shall consider a number of alternative trading setups in order to analyse 
the effects of trade liberalization.  
 The inverse demand for the final good is given by: 
 )( 21 yybap +−= ,  (1)  
where p is the price of the good, a and b are constants, and 1y  and 2y are the quantities 
produced by firm 1 and 2 respectively. 
 We assume that the production of the final good requires a non-generic intermediate 
component or service. The firm can choose a vertical integration strategy in which it invests 
in the development of and produces this input itself, or an outsourcing strategy in which it 
sources it from an outside unaffiliated supplier. Due to the specialised nature of the input, if 
                                                 
9   An extension to differentiated products is straightforward but would not yield many additional insights. 
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the firm chooses to outsource, it will not be able to purchase the intermediate from a spot 
market. Instead it must buy it from a supplier that has made a relationship-specific 
investment (RSI) in the development of the input.10  
 We allow both firms to decide whether to become vertically integrated or to follow an 
outsourcing strategy. Firm i can make the intermediate in-house at a marginal cost of ir  or 
buy it from an upstream supplier at the price iq . We assume that the intermediate must be 
combined in fixed proportions with other factors of production; we model these factors as a 
composite input whose price is normalised at unity. Units are chosen so that one unit of the 
customised intermediate is required per unit of output.   For firm i, let 0>−= ii zee  be the 
per-unit input requirement for the composite input, where e  is a constant and iz  captures 
the ‘usefulness’ of the intermediate: a better intermediate, from the point of view of the 
downstream firm, is one that requires to be combined with fewer other inputs in order to 
produce a unit of output. Using the superscripts V and O to denote vertical integration and 
outsourcing respectively, marginal production cost for firm i =1,2 will thus be:   
 iii
V
i zerc −+= ,  (2a) 
if the intermediate is produced in-house and:  
 iii
O
i zeqc −+= , (2b)  
if it is outsourced. 
 Let K be investment in quality and customisation of the intermediate, with 22zK γ= . 
Thus, the usefulness of the input ( γ/2Kz = ) increases in K but at a diminishing rate. The 
parameter γ determines the cost of investment in quality.  
 In line with the literature on vertical integration, we assume that vertically integrated 
firms incur governance costs – à la Williamson (1975, 1985) – that are higher than those of a 
firm that outsources; without loss of generality, we shall then set the governance cost for the 
latter to zero.11  If firm i is vertically integrated, its profit function is therefore given by:  
                                                 
10  The relationship specificity of investment, in the presence of incomplete investment contracts, gives rise to 
a hold-up problem.   
11  For a discussion and further references on fixed governance costs see McLaren (2000). 
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 iii
V
i
V
i GKycp −−−= )(π , (3a) 
where Gi represents the fixed component of the governance costs of running a larger and 
more complex organisation.12 If the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function will 
therefore be: 
 i
O
i
O
i ycp )( −=π . (3b)  
Note that, by outsourcing, a firm avoids both the governance cost associated with vertical 
integration and the investment cost associated with the intermediate. The latter, is now borne 
by the upstream supplier.  We shall also use  i to represent the upstream firm that has a 
bilateral outsourcing relationship with the downstream firm i (thus  the subscript i=1,2 refers  
to an upstream-downstream pair); therefore,  the supplier earns operating profit: i
u
ii mrq )( − , 
where uir  is the marginal cost it incurs in producing the intermediate and im  is its output .  
Note that we assume that the marginal production cost of the intermediate can differ 
depending on whether it is produced in-house or by the upstream firm, thus ur  is not 
necessarily equal to r.  Differences between ur  and r  can be due to a host of reasons – e.g. 
higher marginal costs associated with the governance of a vertically integrated firm, factor 
cost advantages that a supplier might enjoy, technological differences or differences in 
expertise between the firms. Making use of the fact that one unit of the intermediate is 
needed in the production of each unit of final output, we can write ii ym = . The upstream 
firm invests 2/2i
u
i
u
i zK γ= , and must pay a fixed entry cost Fi.  Its total profit is: 
 i
u
ii
u
iii FKyrq −−−= )(μ . (4) 
The model is a four stage game.  In stage one, the downstream firms decide whether 
to outsource their intermediate or to produce it in-house.  If they decide to outsource, they 
approach a specialised supplier firm which will produce the input. In stage two, the firms 
invest in the development of the intermediate.  If the downstream firms choose to outsource, 
then the upstream supplier firms undertake this investment.  In stage three, the firms that 
                                                 
12 Clearly, running a larger and more complex organisation can result in higher fixed and/or marginal costs. G 
captures the fixed aspect of these costs. As we will mention below, our model also allows for the possibility of 
higher marginal costs associated with the governance issues of vertical integration. For expositional simplicity, 
we shall refer to G as the governance costs.    
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outsource bargain with the intermediate supplier over the price of the input.  We assume that 
the final good producer only has enough time to negotiate with a single supplier.  As in 
Grossman and Helpman (2003), should bargaining breakdown, the producer will not have 
sufficient time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit the market – while the 
supplier will have wasted its investment.13  In stage four, the intermediate is supplied and the 
final output is produced.14  
 We are concerned with the subgame perfect equilibria, hence the game is solved by 
backward induction. In the final stage, the two firms engage in Cournot competition, with 
outputs determined by the following first-order conditions: 
 0=−−=
∂
∂
i
h
i
i
i bycp
y
π , (5)  
where i=1,2 and ch will vary depending on the mode of operation (h=V,O) chosen by the 
firms.  The resulting equilibrium output of firm i will then be: 
 
b
cca
y
k
j
h
i
i 3
2 +−
= ,                      (6) 
where (h,k=V,O) and (i,j=1,2) with (i≠j). 
 In stage three, recognising that all fixed and investment costs are now sunk, the final 
good firms (if they are outsourcing) bargain with an upstream supplier over the price of their 
intermediate.  When both firms outsource, the two upstream and downstream pairs bargain 
simultaneously.  The price iq  of the intermediate good results from the maximisation of the 
following Nash bargain: 
 
1
( ) ( )i iO ui i i i i iN p c y q r y
β β−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , (7) 
                                                 
13  Given that the intermediate component in this model is a non-generic input which is highly specific to the 
particular downstream firm, we model the relationship between upstream and downstream firms as a 
bilateral one – between a specific firm and a specific supplier. The supplier cannot sell the intermediate to 
another firm and the buyer cannot buy it from a firm that has not carried out the relationship specific 
investment. Only one firm will enter the intermediate market to make this investment; this is because if 
more than one supplier entered, they would play a Bertrand game with each other, driving the intermediate 
price to its marginal production cost. In this instance, suppliers would be unable to cover their 
development and entry costs. Anticipating this, only one supplier firm will enter in equilibrium. 
14  This set up corresponds to the ‘informal arrangement’ described by McLaren (1999), who argues that 
trade liberalisation works towards less formality in contracting, making informal arrangements more 
likely.  
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where iβ  and ( iβ−1 ) represent the bargaining power of the typical downstream firm and its 
upstream partner respectively, with 0 0iβ≤ ≤ . Note that we have used mi = yi to eliminate 
mi.  Taking the first–order condition for the maximisation of iN  with respect to iq  and 
rearranging, we obtain: 
 i
i
iu
ii byrq ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
+= β
β
1
1
2
3 . (8) 
The equilibrium mark-up of the intermediate supplier, uii rq − , falls in the downstream firm’s 
bargaining power, but increases in its output iy .
15  The rent-extracting ability of the 
intermediate firm will be higher, ceteris paribus, the weaker is the bargaining position of the 
final good producer and the larger is the latter’s output.  Although iq  must be larger than 
u
ir , 
it needs not be higher than ir .  Furthermore, even if iq  is lower than ir , it may still be the 
case that the marginal production cost of a vertically integrated firm is lower than that of a 
downstream firm that chooses to outsource. This is because the final good marginal 
production cost also depends on the quality of the intermediate and thus on the level of 
investment in its development.  As we shall see, in fact, the level of investment may be 
lower under outsourcing.  
 In stage 2, the firms choose their investment levels simultaneously. We can model this 
decision as firms each choosing the level of iz , since this is directly related to that of 
investment.  A firm that produces the intermediate in-house, will choose iz  to maximise 
(3a). The corporate governance costs, Gi, have already been sunk before the firms invest so 
they play no part in the optimal choice of investment levels. In making this choice, each firm 
takes account of both the direct cost-reducing effect of its investment on its own profit and 
                                                 
15  The purchase of intermediate components is sometimes assumed to involve the combination of a fixed 
lump-sum payment and a price set at marginal cost.  As highlighted by Spencer (2005), however, the 
transfer of rents through lump-sum payments is at odds with stylised facts about domestic and international 
transactions.  Our paper recognizes that outsourcing contracts typically involve strictly positive prices that 
exceed marginal costs, with the distribution of rents between intermediate supplier and final good producer 
– and hence the returns to relationship specific investment – being determined through Nash bargaining 
over the price after investment is sunk. The resulting ‘double marginalisation’ is also an important feature 
of transaction costs economics – indeed, in the words of Williamson, a key distinction between the 
transaction costs and the Grossman-Hart-Moore property right framework is their assumption of costless 
bargaining (Williamson, 2000). 
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the strategic effect on its rival’s output in the final stage.  Thus, firm i’s first-order condition 
is:   
 0=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
i
j
j
i
i
i
i
i
dz
dy
yzdz
d πππ ,  (9) 
where the first term on the right-hand side, ( ) iiiiiiiViii zyzyzcz γγπ −=−∂∂−=∂∂ // , is the 
direct effect of zi on own profits.  The second term captures the strategic effect on the 
investment decision of the firm.  Specifically, in the second term, iiji bypyy −=′=∂∂ /π . 
The expression for the term ij dzdy /  differs depending on the mode of operation of firm j. If 
the rival firm j is vertically integrated, then bzcbdzdy i
V
iij 3/1)/)(3/1(/ −=∂∂= . Thus, in 
this case, the strategic effect ( )( )ijji dzdyy // ∂∂π  is positive and hence encourages the firm to 
invest more in the development of the intermediate good.  The first-order condition for a 
firm that is vertically integrated and faces a vertically integrated rival can then be rewritten 
as: 
  VVii
VVVV
i byz ηθ= ,                           where 3/4=VVθ , (10a) 
and where ii bγη /1≡  is a measure of the effectiveness of investment; also note that we adopt 
the convention that, when there are two superscripts, the first refers to firm i and the second 
to firm j.  If, instead, the rival firm j outsources, then even though firm i’s first-order 
condition takes the same form as in (9), the derivative ij dzdy /   is different, as zi now also 
affects jy  through changes in jq .  Hence, the strategic incentive for firm i’s investment is 
lessened as a result of the endogenous change in the price of the intermediate because now 
ij dzdy / = )/)(3/2()/)(3/1( i
O
ji
V
i zcbzcb ∂∂−∂∂ , with the derivative ijiOj dzdqdzdc // =  = 
ijjj dzbdy /)]1/()1)[(2/3( ββ +− . Rearranging, we get: 0)1)(6/1(/ <+−= jij bdzdy β , the 
absolute value of which is less than that in the vertical integration case (where ij dzdy / = –
1/3b) except when 1=jβ , that is when firm j has maximum bargaining power in its 
negotiations with the supplier  firm.  Thus, the first-order condition for a vertically integrated 
firm facing a rival that outsources can be rewritten as:    
 12
 VOii
VO
i
VO
i byz ηθ= ,                 where  6
7 jVO
i
βθ += .   (10b) 
 Thus, outsourcing by one firm ‘softens’ the behaviour of its rival, i.e. it reduces its 
aggressiveness in investment. We will return to this issue later when we discuss the strategic 
motive for outsourcing.  
 If the intermediate is outsourced, then the investment is carried out by the upstream 
firm which only receives a share (determined by its bargaining power) of the rent generated 
by the investment; as a result, it does not fully appropriate the marginal benefit of its 
investment and this reduces its incentive to invest. We can use (8) in (4) to obtain:   
 i
u
ii
i
i
i FKby −−+
−
=
2
)1(
)1(
2
3
β
βμ . (11) 
The first order condition for the profit maximising choice of zi is then: 
 0
)1(
)1(3 =−
+
−
= i
u
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i z
dz
dyby
dz
d γβ
βμ . (12)  
The expression for ii dzdy /  differs depending on whether the rival is vertically integrated or 
outsourcing. When the rival is vertically integrated it is straightforward to use (2b) and (6) to 
show that { })/)(/()/()3/2(/ iiiiiiii dzdqqczcbdzdy ∂∂+∂∂−=  which simplifies to: 
03/)1(/ >+= bdzdy iii β . We can use this in (12) to obtain: 
 OVi
u
i
OV
i
OV
i byz ηθ=               where  )1( iOVi βθ −= , (13a) 
and where ui
u
i bγη /1≡ . However, when the rival firm is outsourcing, then straightforward (if 
lengthy) calculations show that the effect of zi on yi becomes 
0)15/()1)(7)(3/2(/ >−++++= jijiijii bdzdy ββββββ . The use of this in (12) yields:  
 OOi
u
i
OO
i
OO
i byz ηθ=               where  )1(15
)7(2
i
OO
i jiji
j βθ ββββ β −= −++ + . (13b) 
Again, outsourcing by one firm ‘softens’ the investment behaviour of its rival in the sense 
that ii yz /  is lower when its rival outsources its intermediate than when it chooses to 
vertically integrate.  
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Lemma 1. The zi/yi ratio is lower when the rival firm j outsources its intermediate than it is 
when firm j is vertically integrated. 
Proof.  It follows from inspection of expressions (10a), (10b) (13a) and (13b). 
 Furthermore, vertical integration implies a more aggressive investment strategy than 
outsourcing unless uiη is much larger than iη .  
Lemma 2: For a given relative effectiveness of investment ( i
u
i ηη = ) and given the mode of 
operation choice of the rival, firm i’s zi/yi ratio is higher when it is vertically 
integrated than when it outsources.    
Proof.  It follows from inspection of expressions (10a), (10b), (13a) and (13b). 
 In the first stage of the game, the firms simultaneously choose their mode of operation.  
To establish whether a firm will choose to outsource or to be vertically integrated, we must 
compare its profits under the two regimes for a given mode of operation choice of its rival. 
To facilitate this comparison, it proves helpful to derive an expression for the profits in terms 
of outputs and parameters only. By using the first-order conditions in (5) and (10), we can 
rewrite the profit functions in the two regimes respectively as:  
 i
Vk
i
Vk
i
Vk
i Gyb −Ω=
2)(π , (14a) 
and 
 2)( Oki
Ok
i yb=π , (14b) 
where k=(V,O), )1( 98 i
VV
i η−=Ω  and ( )iVOi i ηβ72 )7( 21 +−=Ω . It is immediately obvious from 
equations (14a) and (14b), that a sufficient condition for outsourcing to yield higher profits is 
Vk
i
Ok
i yy ≥ .  Hence, if outsourcing results in an increase in output (perhaps because the 
marginal cost of producing the intermediate is so much lower if it is carried out by a 
specialised upstream producer), then it dominates vertical integration. 
 
3.  The Mode of Operation Equilibria  
We turn now to a discussion of the mode of operation equilibria.  There are four possible 
candidate equilibrium regimes: (VV), (VO), (OV), and (OO), where the first letter refers to 
the mode of operation selected by firm 1 and the second letter refers to that chosen by firm 2.   
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 Our model is quite rich and there are many possible asymmetries between firms. To 
begin with, it proves useful to consider what we will refer to as the base case. In this case, 
the downstream firms are ex ante identical, in that neither firm has an underlying cost 
advantage; the upstream firms are also ex ante identical to each other. In addition, we 
assume the bargaining power parameters to be identical, so that βββ == 21 ; we also 
assume that there is no underlying marginal cost advantage or disadvantage from 
outsourcing – by which we mean that the marginal production cost of the input is the same 
regardless of whether it is made by the downstream or by the upstream supplier (i.e. ui ir r= ). 
Furthermore, we let GGG == 21  – that is, take the fixed governance cost of vertical 
integration to be the same for both firms.   
 Given these symmetry assumptions, we obtain the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Under symmetry, the pattern of equilibria depends on the level of 
governance costs, G: (i) at G=0, the subgame perfect equilibrium entails both firms 
choosing vertical integration (VV); (ii) at sufficiently large levels of G, the subgame 
perfect equilibrium entails both firms choosing to outsource (OO); (iii) at intermediate 
levels of G, multiple asymmetric equilibria (VO) and (OV) occur.    
Proof. See Appendix.  
 Thus, for a range of G, asymmetric outcomes emerge despite the fact that the firms are 
fully symmetric ex ante.  The underlying reason for the emergence of asymmetric equilibria 
derives from a negative interdependence between the firms’ mode of operation decisions. 
The intuition for this is that, given our ex ante symmetry assumptions, vertical integration 
always entails exchanging high fixed costs for lower marginal costs – and is therefore a 
higher output strategy. On the other hand, outsourcing – which involves trading off lower 
fixed costs for higher marginal costs – is a lower output strategy. A firm that faces a rival 
which is vertically integrated has, ceteris paribus, a lower anticipated market share and hence 
a lower incentive to be vertically integrated itself than a firm that faces an outsourced rival. 
Hence, over a range of G, vertical integration is a best response to a rival’s outsourcing but 
outsourcing is a best response to a rival that is vertically integrated. The profit levels in the 
different equilibrium regimes are plotted against the governance costs G in Figure 1 for the 
case of ex-ante symmetry.  When governance costs are low enough, both firms choose 
vertical integration and have the same equilibrium profits. As G rises, asymmetric equilibria 
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emerge: the best reply to a firm’s vertical integration is outsourcing (and vice-versa). In this 
region of G, the vertically integrated firm’s profits are higher than that of the outsourcing 
firm.16 As shown in the figure, the profits of the vertically integrated firm increase when the 
other firm switches to outsourcing. This is because here outsourcing is less aggressive than 
vertical integration and results in lower investment and output. At high levels of G, the 
vertically integrated firm switches to outsourcing and this leads to an increase in the profits 
of the other firm (which is also outsourcing).  
Figure 1 about here 
 Both strategising and economising considerations are at work in determining the 
equilibrium outcomes; in particular, oligopolistic strategic interaction means that – even 
when firms are ex-ante symmetric – asymmetric equilibria (in which firms choose different 
mode of operation strategies) can emerge. A better appreciation of how strategic behaviour 
can be used to soften the behaviour of rivals can be gained by considering underlying 
asymmetries between firms, to which we now turn.  
 
4.  A Closer Look at Strategic Behaviour: Aggressive and Defensive 
Business Strategies  
As highlighted in Lemma 1, outsourcing by one firm softens the investment behaviour of its 
rival. This results in a ‘strategic motive’ to outsource. In this section, we show how the 
choice of the mode of operation can be used strategically by firms to affect the oligopoly 
game between them. To this end, we ask how the make-or-buy decision affects the 
equilibrium market shares and profit levels.  A natural approach to answering this question is 
to consider the effect of the mode of operation on the firms’ output reaction functions and 
thus on outputs. The reaction function of firm i, that is obtained from the output first-order 
condition in (5), can be written as );( ijii cyy ψ= . Note that the effect of outsourcing on ic  
occurs via changes in iz  and iq .  It therefore proves useful, by making appropriate 
substitutions given the solutions of previous stages of the game, to eliminate iz  and iq .  The 
                                                 
16  Nevertheless, in this region of parameter space, the outsourcing firm does not have an incentive to 
vertically integrate given that its rival is vertically integrated – as then both it and its rival would have 
lower profits.   
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resulting functions, which we call output response functions,17  take account of the indirect 
effect of outsourcing on outputs through changes in the level of investment and the price of 
the intermediate good. We will use these functions to illustrate what happens when one of 
the firms chooses to outsource rather than to vertically integrate.  In the absence of 
outsourcing, these output response functions for firm 1 and firm 2 are, respectively: 
 VV
VV
VV
bM
byAy
1
2
1
−
= ,           (15a) 
and  
 VV
VV
VV
bM
byAy
2
1
2
−Φ−
= , (15b) 
where )2( 11 ηθ VVVVM −= , )2( 22 ηθ VVVVM −=  and )( 11 reaA −−= .  The parameter 
2 2 1 1e r e rΦ = + − −  can be thought of as the underlying (‘pre-investment’) marginal cost 
disadvantage of firm 2 which can reflect relative productivity differences (of course Φ could 
be negative, giving firm 2 an ex ante cost advantage). When firm 2 chooses to outsource but 
firm 1 remains vertically integrated, the corresponding output response functions are: 
 VO
VO
VO
bM
byAy
1
2
1
−
=  (16a) 
and 
   VO
VO
VO
bM
byAy
2
12
2
−+Φ−
=
ρ , (16b) 
where )2( 111 ηθ VOVOM −=  and { } { })1(2/)1(27 222222 ββηβ +−−+= uVOM . Note that here we 
are using the first superscript to refer to firm 1 and the second to firm 2. Thus, VOy2  is the 
output of firm 2 when firm 1 is vertically integrated and firm 2 is outsourcing. The parameter 
urr 222 −=ρ  captures the difference between the marginal costs of producing the 
intermediate incurred by the downstream firm 2 (when it is vertically integrated) and by its 
upstream intermediate supplier.  Thus, when 02 >ρ , the upstream firm has a cost advantage 
over the downstream firm in producing the intermediate. 
                                                 
17    These are effectively reduced form reaction functions.   
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 These functions are illustrated in Figure 2.  In the figure, we assume ex ante symmetry 
between the firms, so that 0Φ =  and 21 ηη = . In the Figure, we allow for both 02 =ρ  and 
02 >ρ . We begin by discussing the case in which 02 =ρ  and shall return to consider the 
case in which 02 >ρ  later in the section.  The curves labelled 1R  and 2R  are the output 
response functions for firm 1 and 2 respectively when both firms are vertically integrated. 
The equilibrium is at point E.  The curve labelled 1R′  is the output response function of firm 
1 when firm 2 outsources the intermediate; the curve labelled 2R′  is the output response 
function of firm 2 when it outsources.  In this case, the corresponding equilibrium is at point 
E′ .  Inspection of equations (15) and (16) reveals that, at 02 =ρ , a switch to outsourcing by 
firm 2 does not affect the zero-output intercept of these curves (which depend only on the 
terms in the numerators). It does however lead to a pivoting inwards of firm 2’s output 
response function about the zero-output point – provided  that VOVV MM 22 <  (this will be true 
unless 22 ηη −u  is sufficiently large), which is the case illustrated in the figure.18  The reason 
why firm 2’s output response function pivots inwards is twofold.  First, the firm now faces a 
higher marginal cost of the intermediate, as the upstream firm captures some of the available 
rents. Second, the investment behaviour is now less aggressive as explained earlier.  Firm 1’s 
output response function always pivots inwards when its rival outsources, as VOVV MM 11 <  
given that VOVV θθ > .  At the new equilibrium E′ , total production is lower.   
Figure 2 about here 
 The effect of outsourcing on firms’ market shares will depend on Φ, the extent of the 
relative cost difference between the two firms.   When Φ is small (as in Figure 2), so that the 
firms have ex-ante very similar efficiencies, outsourcing by firm 2 lowers its market share 
and raises the market share of firm 1.  This does not imply, however, that outsourcing 
necessarily reduces firm 2’s profits, since it must be remembered that it also saves on 
governance costs.   When Φ is large enough, i.e. when firm 2 is sufficiently less efficient 
than its competitor, then the market share shifting effect of outsourcing is reversed.  We 
                                                 
18  Firm 1’s output response function would remain unchanged at 022 =−ηη u  in the mathematically limiting 
case of 12 =β , when  urq 22 =  and 02 =z . However, we rule out this degenerate case by assumption. 
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show this in Figure 3 in which ρ2=0 and Φ is large.  Compared to Figure 2, firm 2’s output 
response functions have moved inward.  Inspection of (15) and (16) reveals that firm 1’s 
output response curves are independent of Φ, whilst an increase in Φ shifts firm 2’s output 
response functions inwards in a parallel manner.   In Figure 3, outsourcing by firm 2 
increases its own market share at the expense of firm 1.  As we have seen, the change in 
regime between outsourcing and vertical integration causes the output response curves to 
pivot around the firms’ zero output points.  Thus, the effect of outsourcing on an output 
response curve is greater the further away we are from the firm’s zero output point. When Φ 
is high, firm 2’s relative market share is small and the negative impact of outsourcing on 
firm 2’s output response curve is locally very small, while the negative effect on the 
corresponding curve for firm 1 is locally much larger.  The net result is that firm 1’s output 
falls and firm 2’s output rises.  
 The results obtained so far in this section can be summarised by the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2. Outsourcing by a firm can never result in an increase in the output of both 
firms. In addition, when ρ1=ρ2=0 and ηi=ηiu (i=1,2), then: (i) at Φ=0, firm i’s output 
always falls if it outsources; and (ii) there exist values of Φ large enough such that 
outsourcing by firm 2 increases its output at the expense of firm 1’s. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 Note that the seemingly paradoxical result that VVVO yy 22 >  when Φ is very large, 
despite an inward shift of the output response curve, is due to the strategic interaction 
between firms under oligopoly and would not occur under monopoly.  The firm’s decision to 
outsource can raise its own market share when the effect on the strategic aggressiveness of 
its rival is very strong.  This is more likely to be the case the larger is the rival’s market share 
in the equilibrium with vertical integration; the reason for this is that the bigger and more 
powerful is one’s competitor, the larger is the gain from reducing its aggressiveness.19  In 
this sense, outsourcing can be thought of as a defensive business strategy helping a firm to 
hold on to its market share and, in some cases, to remain in business when it otherwise 
                                                 
19   In this analysis we have, for simplicity, focused on the case of Φ>0.  If Φ<0, firm 1 is small and the 
returns to firm 2 from reducing its aggressiveness by outsourcing is consequently reduced. Hence, at ρ2=0 
and with Φ<0, outsourcing could never increase firm 2’s output. Therefore, Φ<0 is qualitatively a special 
case of Φ small.  
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would not. Because of this strategic effect, outsourcing can sometimes be optimal even when 
it is unambiguously cost increasing.   
Figure 3 about here  
 As we saw in the previous section, VVVO yy 22 ≥  is a sufficient condition for 
VO
2π >
VV
2π  . 
Thus, even when ρ2=0 and 022 =−ηη U  (or even when 2ρ and/or 22 ηη −U  are slightly 
negative), outsourcing is preferred if, due to an underlying cost disadvantage, firm 2’s 
market share is small enough.  Thus we have the following corollary to Proposition 2(ii):    
Corollary. Even when G2=0, ρ2=0 and 2 2uη η=  (i=1,2), there exist values of  Φ large 
enough for firm 2 to prefer outsourcing over vertical integration.  
 When vertical integration reduces the rival’s output it can be seen as an aggressive 
business strategy. This is the case for firm 2 when Φ is not too large, as in Figure 2, when 
the firm has a strategic incentive to vertically integrate.  
  Sometimes outsourcing can lead to much lower production costs than in-house 
production. This is the case when the upstream firm is much more efficient than its 
downstream partner in producing the intermediate. Thus, we can see in Figure 2 that if 
02 >ρ ,  then firm 2’s output response function, in addition to pivoting inward, also shifts 
outwards in a parallel manner.  A comparison of (15) and (16) reveals that whilst firm 2 
switching to outsourcing does not affect the numerator in the output response function for 
firm 1, it will affect that of firm 2 if 02 >ρ  – i.e. when the underlying marginal cost of 
producing the intermediate is lower under outsourcing than under vertical integration.  Note 
that outsourcing can be an aggressive business strategy that raises foreign output at the 
expense of firm 1 (as illustrated in Figure 2) even when Φ is zero.  For this to happen, 
however, 2ρ  needs to be positive and very large. In Figure 2, the dotted curve labelled 2R′′ is 
the output response function of firm 2 when it outsources and 2ρ  is large enough to cause its 
equilibrium output to rise. 
Proposition 3.  At Φ=0 and ηi−ηiu=0 (i=1,2), there always exists a ρi large enough such 
that a switch to outsourcing by firm i raises its output at the expense of the output of 
firm j.  
Proof.  See Appendix. 
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5.  Outsourcing and International Trade 
A major reason for the upsurge of interest in the literature on the mode of operation decision 
of firms has been the perception that there is a positive relationship between outsourcing and 
trade liberalisation. However, it is noteworthy that much outsourcing is actually domestic in 
character, being carried out within national boundaries. Also, firms can offshore production 
of intermediates while keeping them in house through foreign direct investment. Thus, how 
globalisation and trade policy affect the internalisation decision of a firm depends on 
whether the outsourcing or the vertical integration is domestic or international. In this 
section, we will apply our model to a number of different trading setups in order to examine 
how the internationalisation and internalisation strategies of firms interact. Specifically, we 
examine the effect of trade liberalisation, modelled as a fall in trade costs, on the incentives 
of firms to outsource – and thus on the mode-of-operation equilibria. We will show that 
changes in trade costs can impact on these incentives by affecting the underlying cost 
differences between firms. Thus, for instance, if firms are located in different countries, then 
trade liberalisation can affect their costs of supplying a market asymmetrically. We discuss 
this case in Section 5.1. Trade liberalisation can also affect firms’ costs by making it 
relatively cheaper to procure inputs from abroad; we discuss this in section Section 5.2.  To 
focus on the impact of changes in trade cost on the game played by the firms we abstract 
from other asymmetries between firms that derive from underlying differences in the 
efficiencies of investment, or from differences between downstream firms in their 
governance costs or in their bargaining power vis à vis upstream firms. Thus, we shall 
assume throughout this section that 21 GG = , 21 ββ = , 21 ηη = , and uii ηη =  (i=1,2). 
(Relaxing this simplifying assumption yields no real additional insights). 
 
5.1. Trade liberalisation as an intensification of competitive pressure  
In this subsection we consider how outsourcing can be a response to an increase in foreign 
competition resulting from trade liberalisation. To examine this, we consider the following 
setup: downstream firm 1 is located in the home country while firm 2 produces its final good 
in a foreign location.  The firms compete on the home market. To focus on the effect of trade 
liberalisation on the relative incentive to outsource via the intensification of competitive 
pressure route, we will assume that firms outsource from domestic suppliers, i.e. we rule out 
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international outsourcing. The effect of trade liberalisation on the relative cost of foreign 
outsourcing will be discussed in the next subsection. Clearly, one could consider a setup 
with foreign outsourcing that combines the two effects, but this would yield less transparent 
results. 
 The trade costs faced by firm 2 will be parameterized by a per-unit tariff τ. This can be 
neatly incorporated into the firm’s marginal cost by including it in 2e . As a result, the cost 
difference parameter Φ is now increasing in the tariff. Trade liberalisation will reduce Φ and 
this will have implications for output, prices and investment under a given regime and, under 
certain circumstances, it will also lead to a regime shift.   We shall begin by examining the 
effects of trade liberalization within a given regime and then consider its effects on regime 
outcomes.    
 Under a given regime, a fall in τ improves the relative competitive position of firm 2 
at the expense of firm 1 and this will yield a market share reallocation in favour of the 
former.  Under outsourcing, this market share reallocation results in a fall in the negotiated 
price of the intermediate good in the home country. This is because trade liberalisation 
decreases the available rents to be bargained over by the domestic downstream and upstream 
firms.  
 A fall in trade costs can also lead to regime shifts as it can affect firms’ decisions 
about their mode of operation. A fall in τ (and hence in Φ) will increase the incentive of firm 
2 and decrease the incentive of firm 1 to choose vertical integration.20  
 In Figure 4, at free-trade, firm 2 has an underlying cost advantage.  In notational 
terms: Φ<0 at τ=0.  Giving firm 2 a cost advantage at free-trade allows us to present cases in 
which Φ is positive and cases in which it is negative on the same diagram. At high values of 
t (Φ>0), firm 1 has a cost advantage, while at low values of t (Φ<0), firm 2 has a cost 
advantage.21 
 
Figure 4 about here 
                                                 
20  Under outsourcing, trade liberalisation increases the profit of the intermediate supplier in the foreign 
country and reduces the profit of the intermediate supplier in the home country. Clearly, excessive 
competitive pressure may prevent outsourcing from being supplied.   
21  Other constellations of parameters values can be considered but this one is chosen because it captures all 
the interesting cases.  
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 As can be seen from the figure,22 at sufficiently low levels of governance costs, and 
with Φ>0, a fall in τ  will eventually lead to a switch from the (V,O) to the (V,V) regime (as 
firm 1 stays vertically integrated and firm 2 is induced to change regime). At negative values 
of Φ, further trade liberalisation can result in a switch from (V,V) to (O,V).  At sufficiently 
high levels of governance costs, and with Φ>0, trade liberalisation leads to a move from 
(V,O) to (O,O), as firm 1 is induced to outsource whilst firm 2 remains outsourced. When 
Φ<0, further reductions in trade costs can result in a shift to the (O,V) equilibrium region. 
 In Figure 5, we see that (V,O) is the typical outcome when τ is high and hence firm 2 
has a strong competitive disadvantage; however,  for low trade costs, (O,V) can emerge as 
the competitive advantage swings towards firm 2. Also note that the range of G over which 
multiple equilibria occurs is at its largest when Φ is zero.   
 Finally, it is interesting to briefly explore the implications of the analysis for the 
effects of trade liberalisation on the consumer in the home country.  With this particular 
trading set up, trade liberalisation at a given regime raises output and thus works to increase 
consumer surplus. This increase in consumer surplus is further enhanced when the fall in 
trade cost reaches a threshold level of τ that causes firm 2 to switch to vertical integration.  
This is because when firm 2 switches to vertical integration, both its own output and that of 
the industry experience a discrete upward jump. However, a tariff reduction will lead to a 
discrete downward jump in consumer surplus when it results in the crossing of a threshold τ 
that brings about a switch to outsourcing by firm 1. This implies that, somewhat counter-
intuitively, consumer surplus is not always maximised at free-trade.  
 
5.2. Trade liberalisation and the costs of international outsourcing 
Trade liberalisation may also change the relative cost of outsourcing. This is particularly 
plausible if the firms have the possibility to outsource abroad. To disentangle the effect of 
trade costs on the costs of outsourcing from the effect of trade costs on the competitive 
                                                 
22   The curves dividing up the parameter space in Figure 4 are the relevant sections of the two firms’ 
indifference profit loci in Φ and G space – which give the combinations of Φ and G at which firms are 
indifferent between outsourcing and vertical integration, given the mode of operation chosen by their rival. 
In the figure, the first superscript in the profit indifference conditions refers to the mode of operation of 
firm 1 and the second to that of firm 2. So, for instance, 1 1
VV OVπ π= refers to the indifference locus of firm 
1, given that firm 2 is vertically integrated. Similarly, 2 2
OV OOπ π=  refers to the indifference locus of firm 2, 
given that firm 1 is outsourcing. 
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pressure faced by firms, we shall assume that the two downstream firms are located in the 
same country or in a custom’s union so that further trade liberalisation does not affect the ex-
ante relative cost differences between them. To begin with, we shall focus on the case in 
which the firm chooses between domestic vertical integration and foreign outsourcing – i.e. 
we shall rule out the possibility of vertical foreign direct investment. We again parameterize 
trade cost by a per-unit tariff τ. To deliver the input to the home country when a firm 
outsources from abroad, the firm must pay τ per unit of output.23   This can be neatly 
incorporated into the firm’s profits by adding it to its marginal costs when the firm 
outsources abroad, but not when it produces the intermediate in-house domestically.  When 
we adopt this specification, the parameter iρ  – which captures the difference between the 
marginal costs of producing the intermediate incurred by the downstream firm and its 
upstream outsourcing partner – is decreasing in the tariff.  
 Figure 5 illustrates the effect of trade liberalisation on the mode of operation when the 
two firms are ex-ante symmetric but the upstream firms have lower marginal production 
costs than the downstream firms. Unsurprisingly, a fall in tariff leads to an increase in the 
range of parameter values at which firms outsource. Interestingly, once again, trade 
liberalisation does not necessarily have a monotonic effect on consumer surplus if it leads to 
more outsourcing – since a switch to outsourcing will lead to an upward jump in the price of 
the good. 
Figure 5 about here 
 We have now seen two routes by which trade liberalisation may encourage 
outsourcing. However, we will now consider a setup in which, by contrast, trade 
liberalisation leads to more vertical integration. Suppose that the costs of setting up a fully 
owned subsidiary in which the intermediate can be developed and produced are not 
prohibitively high, as we had implicitly assumed above by ruling out this mode of operation 
option. Instead, assume now that foreign vertical integration dominates domestic vertical 
integration – perhaps because production or investment costs are lower abroad than in the 
home country. Hence, the relevant trade-off is now between international outsourcing and 
                                                 
23  Note that the results would not be materially changed were we to assume instead, that it is the upstream 
firm that pays the tariff.  Note too that effectively we are assuming an asymmetry between the trade cost 
associated with selling the final good and importing the intermediate. This implies that the supplier is 
located, for instance, in an LDC that is geographically farther away.  
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international vertical integration. We will refer to the latter as FDI. Assume that under both 
outsourcing and vertical integration the downstream firm must pay a trade cost of τ  per unit 
of output to deliver this input to the home country where it is combined with the composite 
input. In the interests of clarity, we continue to assume that the firms are ex-ante symmetric. 
In order to focus on the trade-off between the different modes of operation, we restrict 
attention to parameter values that imply a lower ex-post marginal production cost for the 
final producer under FDI than under outsourcing. Outsourcing however involves a lower 
fixed cost. This is due to lower investment and governance costs.   
 We find that in this case trade liberalisation reduces the amount of outsourcing relative 
to FDI. There are two main reasons for this. First, in exchange for facing higher fixed costs, 
the firms that choose FDI have a higher output scale than those that outsource. (This is 
because they have lower marginal costs under vertical integration. This means that any fall 
in per unit trade costs applies to a larger output level under FDI and hence is more beneficial 
to firms choosing the FDI option. Second, trade liberalisation raises the available rents – but 
this increases the opportunity for rent extraction by the upstream firm under outsourcing. A 
fall in trade costs thus leads to an increase in the bargained intermediate price and this 
reduces some of the benefit of trade liberalisation to the downstream firm.  
 The effect of trade liberalisation on the mode of operation outcomes when the trade-off 
is between FDI and international outsourcing is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 about here 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have developed a model of endogenous outsourcing in an international 
oligopoly setting.  In line with some other recent theoretical contributions, we have modelled 
the outsourcing arrangement as one where a final good producer enters a bilateral 
relationship with an upstream supplier which undertakes a relationship-specific investment.  
Previous authors who have adopted this approach have done so within a non-strategic 
monopolistically competitive market structure. We have demonstrated that the oligopolistic 
setup implies that additional strategic considerations play a role in explaining the choice of 
mode of operation of firms.   In particular, we have shown that both strategic vertical 
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integration and strategic outsourcing are possibilities in our model.  A vertically integrated 
firm incurs additional governance costs that can be avoided by sourcing components outside 
the firm.  However, outsourcing is beset with problems of contract incompleteness.  If the 
outside supplier is not significantly more efficient at providing the intermediate to the 
required specifications, outsourcing will raise the final goods producer’s marginal 
production costs since the supplier fails to fully internalise the marginal benefit of its 
investment.  Outsourcing then involves accepting higher marginal costs in exchange for a 
saving on fixed (governance) costs.   In a Cournot oligopoly setting, this gives rise to an 
additional strategic incentive to vertically integrate – as the lower marginal costs reduce the 
rival’s output and thus indirectly raises the integrated firm’s profits. However, strategic 
outsourcing is also a possibility – even when it results in higher marginal costs.  This is 
because when a firm chooses outsourcing, the rival firm’s incentive to invest strategically is 
reduced.  We have shown that when a firm has a sufficiently small market share under 
vertical integration, it has an incentive to strategically switch to outsourcing so as to increase 
its own and reduce its rival’s investment and output.  In the paper, we have assumed Cournot 
competition. It is fairly straightforward to extend our framework to Bertrand competition 
with heterogeneous goods. In that case, to the extent that outsourcing increases the marginal 
cost of production, the strategic incentive to outsource that we find as a result of the 
endogeneity of investment would be reinforced by a standard Bertrand strategic incentive to 
raise the rival’s price. 
 In our model, the choice of the mode of operation by firms is shown to be more 
complex than that implied by standard transaction cost theory and to depend on the 
combined influence of cost considerations (the incentive to economise) and strategic 
considerations. 
 Furthermore, unlike most contributions in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Grossman 
and Helpman, 2002), this model gives rise to the possibility of ‘mixed outcomes’ in which, 
even when firms are ex-ante symmetric, they may choose different modes of operation in 
equilibrium; this is consistent with existing stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same 
industry adopt the same mode of operation.   
 We examined the effects of trade liberalisation on the relative incentive to outsource. 
Trade liberalisation can mean that domestic firms face a tougher competition and we have 
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shown that a firm that faces greater competitive pressure has a greater incentive to outsource. 
Furthermore, trade liberalisation can also reduce the cost of international outsourcing. If the 
relevant trade-off is between domestic vertical integration and international outsourcing, 
then trade liberalisation increases the incentive to outsource. However, if international 
vertical integration in the form of FDI is the viable alternative to outsourcing, then our 
model suggests that trade liberalisation actually reduces the incentive to outsource. 
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Figure 1.   Profit levels of firms as a function of G under ex-ante symmetry  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Output response functions (Φ=0) 
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Figure 3.  Output response functions (Φ is large and 2ρ =0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  The effects of trade liberalisation when the foreign firm has an underlying 
cost advantage in the absence of a tariff  
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Figure 5.  Domestic vertical integration versus international outsourcing: trade 
liberalisation favours outsourcing 
 
 
Figure 6.  International vertical integration (FDI) versus international outsourcing: 
trade liberalisation favours FDI 
G 
τ 
(O,O) 
(V,O) (O,V) 
(V,V) 
VO
iπ =
OO
iπ  
 
At a given G, trade 
liberalisation reduces the 
parameter range over 
which firms outsource 
VV
iπ =
OV
iπ  
G 
τ 
(O,O) 
(V,O) (O,V) 
(V,V) 
VO
iπ =
OO
iπ  
VV
iπ =
OV
iπ  
At a given G, trade 
liberalisation increases the 
parameter range over 
which firms outsource 
 32
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
As a preliminary step to proving this proposition, it is helpful to look at the outputs in the 
fully symmetric base case. When both firms are vertically integrated, their equilibrium 
outputs are both:  
 
)1( +
= VV
VV
Mb
Ay , where with ex-ante symmetry: )2( ηθ VVVVM −= . (A1) 
On the other hand, when both downstream firms are outsourcing their intermediate 
production, their outputs are: 
 
)1( +
= OO
OO
Mb
Ay , where υηθ +−= )2( OOOOM     and β
βυ +
−
= 1
1
2
3 . (A2) 
When one downstream firm is vertically integrated and the other outsources, then the output 
of the vertically integrated one is:  
)1(
)1(
−
−
= OVVO
OV
VO
MMb
MAy , where υηθ +−= )2( OVOVM  and  )2( ηθ VOVOM −= .     (A3) 
The output of the firm that outsources when its rival is vertically integrated is:  
 
)1(
)1(
−
−
= OVVO
VO
OV
MMb
MAy . (A4) 
Let G be the critical level of G above which a firm will choose to outsource given that its 
rival is vertically integrated. Thus:  
G  ( )22 )()( OVVVVV yyb −Ω≡  = ⎟⎟⎠
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β
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b
A  , (A5a) 
where we have made use of expressions (14a), (14b), the definitions of MVV,  MVO and MOV 
above and ΩVV, θVV,  θVO, and θOV , in the text. 
 Similarly, making use of expressions (14a), (14b),the definitions of MOO,  MVO and 
MOV above and ΩVO, θOO,  θVO, and θOV , in the text, we obtain:  
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as the level of G above which a firm will outsource when its rival is also outsourcing. 
Straightforward, if tedious, calculations show that: 
0>> GG .   (A6) 
Below G , vertical integration is a dominant strategy for both firms and hence VV is the 
unique equilibrium. Above G , outsourcing is the dominant strategy for both firms and 
hence OO is the unique equilibrium. For values of G that lie between G  and G , vertical 
integration is the best reply to outsourcing but outsourcing is the best reply to vertical 
integration. Hence when G lies between G  and G , there are two asymmetric equilibria VO 
and OV. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
As a preliminary step, we will find it useful to rewrite the output response functions for the 
different mode-of-operation regimes in compact form: 
 hk
hk
hk
bM
byAy
1
211
1
−+
=
ρδ   and  hk
hk
hk
bM
byAy
2
122
2
−Φ−+
=
ρδ ,   (A7) 
where h=O,V  is the mode of operation of firm 1 and k=O,V  is the mode of operation of 
firm 2. The parameter jδ  (j=1,2) is an indicator variable that is unity if firm j  outsources 
and zero if it is vertically integrated. 
 Using (A7), we can now show that outsourcing by a firm never results in an increase 
in the output of both firms. To see this, note that the output of firm i when firm j is vertically 
integrated is hV
i
hV
jihV
i bM
byA
y
−
=
ˆ
, where (h=V,O) and iii AA ρδ+=ˆ  if i=1, and 
iii AA ρδ+Φ−=ˆ  if i=2.  A comparison of this with the output of firm i when firm j chooses 
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outsourcing, hO
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jihO
i bM
byA
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−
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ˆ
, gives: hOj
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i MM ≥ , we have that if 
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j yy ≥ , and if 
hO
j
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j yy ≤  then 
hV
i
hO
i yy ≤ .  
Thus, the firms’ outputs cannot both increase when one of the firms switches to outsourcing. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2(i).   
We need to show that: (a) OVi
VV
i yy > and (b)
OO
i
VO
i yy > . Here, the first superscript refers to 
the mode of operation of firm i and the second to that of its rival. Since ρ1=ρ2=0, ηi=ηiu 
(i=1,2) and Φ=0, we have full ex ante symmetry between firms here, and so we are able to 
use the hkM values that were given in (A1)-(A3) above for the base case.  These can be 
ranked as follows: VVVOOVOO MMMM >>> . For the case of inequality (a) above, using 
(A1) and (A4), and the ranking of the hkM  values, we can see that:  
 VViVVVOOVVO
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In the case of inequality (b): 
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Hence, at Φ =ρ1=ρ2=0 and ηi=ηiu  (i=1,2), firm i’s output always falls if it outsources. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 (ii).  
Here we assume 0222 =−= ηηρ u , so that there is no underlying cost advantage of 
outsourcing for firm 2. Given that firm 1 chooses mode of operation h (where h can be V or 
O), then the output of firm 2 when it is vertically integrated is: 
1
)1(
21
11
2
−
Φ−−
= hVhV
hVhV
hV
MM
MMAy         (A10) 
This falls in Φ  and reaches zero at, hVΦ=Φ ~ , where: hV
hV
hV
M
MA
1
1 1~ −
=Φ . If firm 2 is 
outsourcing, then its output is:  
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which is also monotonically falling in Φ .  We next need to check if the output of firm 2 is 
positive at hVΦ=Φ ~ . To do this, we must substitute hVΦ=Φ ~ into (A11). It is then clear that:  
at hVΦ=Φ ~ , 02 >
hOy  if and only if hVhO MM 11 > . It is straightforward to show that this is the 
case. By continuity, we can see that for hVy2 close to zero a switch to outsourcing raises the 
output of firm 2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.   
The larger is iρ , the more firm i’s output response curve shifts outwards. It is clear that if 
this shift is large enough, then the output of firm i rises. From Proposition 2, this will lead to 
a fall in the output of firm j. 
 
